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1. Introduction
There is a sizeable literature on the economic implications of regional trade agreements.
Yet almost the entire literature leaves aside the question of why it is that trade agreements
are regional. The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical explanation of why
countries tend to form trade agreements with other countries in the same region rather
than with more distant nations.
In referring to ‘regional trade agreements’ it is generally recognized that members
are geographically close to one another. Prominent examples are the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and European Union (EU). In both cases, members
share common borders (The British Isles and Sweden are separated by sea, but are other-
wise contiguous to other members). Wider evidence that trade blocks are predominantly
regional is provided by WTO (2000), a report titled “Mapping of Regional Trade Agree-
ments”, in which each of the 150 agreements notified to the WTO is represented in map
form. It shows that member countries tend to be geographically close in the majority of
cases.
Krugman (1991) argues that it is ‘natural’ for trade blocks to exist between countries
that are close if distance makes inter-regional trade uneconomical. But Frankel, Stein and
Wei (1995) use a gravity model to show empirically that countries behave preferentially
towards close neighbors; trade volumes in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere are
greater than could be explained by ‘natural determinants’ such as distance, size and
common languages.
In the present paper, a theoretical model is set up which can be used to explain why
trade blocks are regional. An equilibrium is demonstrated in which countries form trade
agreements with (close) countries in the same region, but have no trade agreements with
countries outside the region. To construct the argument, two developments of existing
theory are made in the paper. The first is to extend Brander and Spencer’s (1984) model
of optimal tari¤ setting to allow for variation in the distance between countries. The
second is to extend Bala and Goyal’s (2000) theory of non-cooperative networks to allow
for discrimination in network formation across di¤erent types of player, in this instance
countries of di¤erent regions. These new theories of ‘tari¤ di¤erentiation by distance’
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and ‘discrimination in non-cooperative network formation’ are linked in the model by an
assumption that countries can be grouped into regions. Countries in a region are closer
to each other than to countries in other regions.2
Brander and Spencer (1984) use a profit shifting argument to motivate optimal tari¤s.
The higher the rents made by a foreign firm in the domestic market, the more scope there
is for shifting rents to domestic citizens through the use of higher tari¤s. And because
trading costs increase with distance, firms make higher rents in nearby markets than those
that are further away. So in the absence of an agreement, optimal tari¤s are higher on
imports from countries in the same region than on imports from countries of other regions.
It follows that a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between two close neighbors brings
about larger production and trade gains than between distant countries because the former
entails a larger mutual tari¤ reduction.
Whilst Brander and Spencer’s model provides a basis for individual tari¤ setting,
the structure of trade agreements in the world as a whole is formalized by adapting Bala
and Goyal’s (2000) model of noncooperative network formation. Bala and Goyal bring
the communication networks previously modelled by others, notably Myerson (1977) and
Jackson and Wolinski (1996), into a noncooperative setting.
In communications networks, players benefit from being linked to each other directly
and indirectly. For example, if you know someone is the friend of a friend, you can ring up
the mutual friend for their phone number. As pointed out on many occasions previously,
when communications networks are formed on a cooperative basis they can su¤er from
coordination failures. The problem is illustrated most clearly in the present setting of
2Other papers in the literature have had similar concerns to the present paper, or used modes of
analysis that are technically similar. Bond (1999) is closest in the question that he addresses. He
compares the sustaintability of multilateral versus regional trade agreements in a repeated game setting,
where both types of agreement are sustained through trigger strategies. Bond finds that optimal tari¤s are
higher between closer neighbours, and that this makes regional agreements easier to sustain using trigger
strategies. Whilst some of Bond’s results are related, his approach is quite di¤erent, not using profit
shifting to motivate tari¤s, nor the notion of non-cooperative networks to determine equilibrium. The
approach of the present paper allows a wider range of dynamic equilibria to be characterised, as discussed
below. Other papers, by Goyal and Joshi (2000) and Furusawa and Konishi (2002) are technically similar,
in modelling trade agreements as networks. Both papers show that free trade will not necessarily arise.
In the case of Goyal and Joshi (2000) this is due to coordination failure. Furusawa and Konishi (2002)
show that free trade fails when countries form customs unions. Both papers take a cooperative rather
than a non-cooperative approach to the modelling of trade agreements as networks, and neither paper
has a regional dimension.
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trade agreements by Goyal and Joshi (2000). They model FTAs in the manner of a
communication network and network formation is cooperative. As a result, whilst free
trade is the most e¢cient Nash equilibrium, it is by no means the unique Nash equilibrium.
Other less e¢cient FTA structures can be an equilibrium because countries may simply
fail to coordinate on membership. In the present context it is important to rule out such
possibilities. Otherwise it would be possible to have equilibria with only regional trade
blocks resting on nothing more than failures of coordination.
Bala and Goyal address the problem of coordination failure by making individual
agents responsible for the cost of coordinating a network. Through their sponsorship,
individual agents can form a network if it is in their interest without being encumbered
by the need to coordinate with other agents. Then a Nash network is one where no agent
can do any better by sponsoring any other network or withdrawing their support for the
networks that they sponsor, taking as given networks that they do not sponsor.
By taking a noncooperative network approach, coordination failures are ruled out as
a possible cause for regional FTAs. In order to model FTA formation in the setting of
a noncooperative network, we will say that each FTA must have a sponsor. There are
of course many di¤erent types of cost associated with setting up a FTA. These include
the cost of bringing together policy-makers and o¢cials at the outset, costs imposed
by interest groups opposed to the FTA, costs of designing the administrative system
required to run the agreement and the ongoing cost of maintaining it. As the framework
of this present paper is essentially a dynamic network formation game, it is the ongoing
period-by-period running costs of maintaining an agreement that are invoked to justify
the costs of FTA formation in this stylized setting. These might include border controls,
verification systems, government customs and excise departments. Such mechanisms of
support and verification are a necessary part of a FTA. In any period of the game, the
country sponsoring these mechanisms can deviate by withdrawing their financial support
for any of the FTAs that it sponsors. If a country undertakes to sponsor a FTA then
all the proposed partners accept because they anticipate (and realize) production-trade
gains.
The main result of the paper concerns the characterisation of the equilibrium FTA
structure that emerges over time under di¤erent levels of sponsorship cost. Not surpris-
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ingly, if sponsorship costs are above a certain level then no FTAs will form at any point
on the equilibrium path, and if they are below a certain level then world free trade will
emerge straight away. It is when sponsorship costs are at an intermediate level that re-
gionalism arises and can persist over time. Perhaps most interesting of all, a range of
sponsorship costs is identified at which regionalism emerges first before free trade can be
reached, providing an answer to Bhagwati’s (1992) famous question, “Are trade blocks
stepping blocks are stumbling blocks in the path to free trade?”
The model is, of course, highly stylized. In practice FTA formation is significantly
more complicated. One complication is that sponsorship of an agreement is likely to
be more balanced between members. However, it seems fair to argue that one country
normally takes a leading role in getting an agreement o¤ the ground, particularly in terms
of its financing. The US played such a leadership role in the setting up of NAFTA, for
example, and Germany has been the biggest financial supporter of the EU. As it stands,
the equilibrium analysis covers the full spectrum of sponsorship costs, showing how the
equilibrium agreement structure changes as sponsorship costs are varied. If it were possible
to treat sponsorship costs in a more subtle way, allowing countries to share the cost of an
agreement with a sponsor or proposer paying a larger share than the others, then the level
of costs at which the equilibrium outcome altered from one structure to another might
change, but the range of possible outcomes would probably not.
One element of network formation required for the present model is the property
that payo¤s vary with di¤erent types of player. In the present context, countries receive
di¤erent payo¤s from agreement formation depending on the distance to the FTA partner.
Discrimination across di¤erent types of player does not feature in previous models of non-
cooperative networks. However, Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) have examined
discrimination in a cooperative model of network formation. The way that they partition
the total set of players by type is used in the model of this present paper. But otherwise
their approach is quite di¤erent. They have an objective hierarchy over players, with a
higher payo¤ being derived from network formation with members of a particular group.
In the present model, variation is subjective. Payo¤s are di¤erentiated from the perspec-
tive of a given individual country over the geographical distance of its FTA partners. This
extension to the standard model of noncooperative network formation is not significant
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in itself. But it does allow the analysis of micro-founded di¤erences in the payo¤ to links
with di¤erent types of player.
The fact that the gains from di¤erent types of network formation can be analyzed,
and that they are derived from an underlying micro-model is a new development of the
present paper worth emphasizing. The relative benefit to a regional agreement comes not
simply because benefits to regional agreements are assumed to be higher. It is instead
because they are derived to be higher. The paper develops a way of linking these di¤erent
micro-founded gains to the payo¤ structure of a network formation game.
This new approach to the analysis of network formation with di¤erent types of player
potentially makes it possible to study a range of di¤erent situations that are of interest
in economics. Perhaps the most famous example is due to Coase (1960), who points
out that firms exerting relatively large externalities on one another are better candidates
for mergers motivated by internalization. This situation examined by Coase mirrors that
analyzed in the present paper in that di¤erent types of player exert externalities of di¤ering
size on one another. The substantive di¤erence is that the externality discussed by Coase
is environmental rather than terms-of-trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section transport costs are introduced to
a model of production and trade based on Cournot oligopolistic competition. This is then
used to derive optimal tari¤s which vary according to the distance between countries.
Section 3 sets up the model of regions and trade agreements as a noncooperative network,
allowing the payo¤s of network formation to vary depending on the distance between
members. Section 4 then establishes the main results of the paper for a simplified three
region model. It is here that the possibility of regional trade agreements is demonstrated,
as well as the fact that trade blocks can be stepping blocks to free trade. Section 5
concludes.
2. A Model of Optimal Tari¤s where Distance Matters
The purpose of this section is to present a model of tari¤ setting which exhibits the prop-
erty that distance between countries has an e¤ect on the optimal level of protectionism.
In particular, it will be shown that optimal tari¤s are higher between close neighbors.
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Brander and Spencer’s (1984) profit shifting argument is used to motivate optimal tari¤s.
Tari¤s shift profits from the foreign firm to the domestic consumer. With lower transport
costs between close neighbors, more rents can be shifted through the use of tari¤s. So
unlike in conventional models, where each country sets a common tari¤ on all others, in
the present model each country sets tari¤s that vary, and are declining with distance.
2.1. Country Location in Regions
The set N = {1, ..., n} is the set of countries and it is finite. The number of countries is
given by |N |. The regional structure P = {R1, R2, ..., Rm} on N is a partition of the set
of countries N into regions, where a region is a set Rk µ N : Ri \ Rj = ; for i 6= j and
[mi=1Ri = N . Each region is assumed to have the same number of countries in it; |Ri| = r,
for all Ri 2 P, and r > 1. To avoid trivialities, there is more than one region; |P| > 1.
To make the di¤erences between intra-regional versus inter-regional trade concrete,
suppose that each country i 2 N can be located by the co-ordinates (xi, yi).3 Therefore,
the distance dij between any two countries i and j can then be measured by a (Euclidean)
distance function.
In order to make precise the distinction between countries by region, assume (xi, yi) =
(xj , yj) for i, j 2 Rk, i 6= j; all countries in the same region have the same location. Also
assume that (xi, yi) 6= (xj, yj) for all i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j. Assume that dij = dji ¸ d > 0
for all i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j, and that dij is finite. (It is already immediate that
dij = dji = 0 for i, j 2 Rk.)
If the distance relationship between countries across regions has some regularity to
it, being based on a regular shape for example, then it will help to be able to sum-
marize the information on distances between countries. So, for country i 2 Ri, let
Di = {(d1, ±1i) , ..., (dz, ±zi)} be the set of pairs (dk, ±ki), where there exists at least one
(other) country j 2 Rj, i 6= j, for which dij = dk, and ±ki gives the number of countries
at that distance from i.
3That is, each country can be located in Euclidean R2-space.
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2.1.1. Example: Three Regions on an Equilateral Triangle
To keep the analysis relatively simple, the main results of the paper will be established
using a three region model. Three regions are enough to capture the interactions we
are interested in, whilst avoiding extensive notation. A three region model is obviously
appealing because it captures the interactions between the three most important regions
in economic terms, The Americas, Europe and Asia.
To fix ideas, consider the three region example (|P| = 3), with r = 3, where each
region is located at a distinct vertex of an equilateral triangle. Label the regions Ra, Rb
and Rc. Consider country i located in region Ra. If the sides of the triangle are of length
d, then countries in Rb and Rc are all at distance d from country i. Then the set Di has
a single element, Di = {(d, 6)}, where (|P| ¡ 1) r = 6 gives the number of countries not
in Ra.
2.2. Production and International Trade with Distance
Each country has a single firm. Firms compete in Cournot competition. They are able to
segment international markets by country. For example, the firm in country j segments
the markets of all countries i 2 N , choosing the quantity to produce (and export if j 6= i)
in order to maximize profits ¼ij in each. Firm j’s problem is formalized in the usual way:
Maxxij ¼ij = (pij ¡ cij) xij (2.1)
where pij, cij and xij are the price, cost and quantity in country i of the good produced
in country j. The cost to the firm in country j of producing a unit of output for sale in
country i is given by the function
cij = c+ tij + dij, (2.2)
where c is the basic per-unit production cost, which is the same for all firms, tij is the
tari¤ levied by country i on imports from country j. It will be assumed as usual that
tari¤ revenue is transferred in lump-sum to consumers. Also, it must be assumed that
transport costs are paid to an agent in the model. To keep the model simple let domestic
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firms compete perfectly to bring goods to the home market, so that they deliver at cost.4
The basis for optimal tari¤ setting in a model of Cournot competition is familiar.
But distance has not been introduced to a general model of tari¤ setting before, and this
potentially makes the model intractable. However, optimal tari¤s with transport costs
can be solved for under the assumption that goods enter preferences independently. Let
ui = e
X
j2N
xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij +mi, (2.3)
wheremi is the numeraire. Countries are endowed with equal quantities of the numeraire,
the role of which is to ensure that trade accounts are balanced in equilibrium.
Taking tari¤s as given, firms choose their respective output levels simultaneously.
They sell their output in country i at the market clearing price. The inverse demand
curve of consumer i is obtained by di¤erentiating (2.3) with respect to xij:
pij =
du
dxij
= e¡ xij , (2.4)
Using (2.4) in (2.1), and expanding,
¼ij = exij ¡ x2ij ¡ cijxij.
The function ¼ij is thus di¤erentiable and strictly concave because ¡x2ij is concave, and
so firm j’s problem has a unique maximum.
Firm j’s first order condition in country i is thus given by
@¼ij
@xij
= e¡ 2xij ¡ cij = 0,
or equivalently,
pij ¡ cij ¡ xij = 0. (2.5)
We can rearrange (2.5) to get
xij = pij ¡ cij
4In a symmetric model, an equivalent assumption would be that the world market for transportation
is competitive and that each firm from every country has an equal share of the market.
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From this, note the following convenient property; in equilibrium, profits can be written
as
¼ij = (pij ¡ cij)xij = x2ij. (2.6)
The fact that profits can be represented in this way arises as a result of the linear structure
of the model.
Use (2.2) and (2.4) in (2.5), then rearrange to get the solution for output by firm j
for country i:
xij =
e¡ c¡ tij ¡ dij
2
, all i, j 2 N (2.7)
Note from (2.7) that xij is decreasing in tij and dij. To maintain the assumption that all
firms are active on all markets, e¡c can be made large enough to ensure that xij > 0. For
the domestic market, tij = dij = 0. Therefore, the weakest possible condition necessary
and su¢cient to ensure strictly positive output by the domestic firm for the domestic
market is e¡ c > 0. This condition will be assumed to hold throughout.
2.3. Production-Trade Payo¤s
The payo¤s to the FTA formation game depend directly on the structure of trading
arrangements, that is tari¤ setting across all countries, and the reciprocal impact on pro-
duction. For this reason, gains to production and trade will be referred to as production-
trade payo¤s. They are given this name to distinguish them from (net) payo¤s to FTA
formation once the cost of sponsoring agreements is taken into account.
The representative citizen in country i receives their trade-production payo¤ through
five economic components: domestic consumer surplus (CSi), the domestic firm’s profit
at home and abroad (¼ii and ¼ji, j 6= i respectively), tari¤ revenue (TRi), and net profits
from transportation (DRi):
wi = CSi + ¼ii +
X
j2N/{i}
¼ji + TRi +DRi. (2.8)
The optimal tari¤ tˆij is derived by maximizing this expression with respect to tij. To do
this, w must be expressed in terms of model variables; the subject of the next result.
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Lemma 1. LetCSi =
P
j2N
1
2
(pij ¡ cij) xij, TRi =
P
j2N/{i} tijxij, andDRi =
P
j2N/{i} dijxij.
Then
wi = CSi + ¼ii +
X
j2N/{i}
¼ji + TRi +DRi.
= (e¡ c)
X
j2N
xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij ¡
X
j2N/{i}
x2ij +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji.
With payo¤s of the representative citizen in country i as given by Lemma 1, it is straight-
forward to solve for the tari¤ that maximizes the representative citizen’s payo¤.
2.4. Optimal Tari¤s with Distance
The solution to the optimal tari¤ problem is given in the following result:
Proposition 1. The unique optimal external tari¤ set by country i on imports from
country j takes the form
tˆij =
e¡ c
3
¡ dij.
The key thing to notice is that the optimal tari¤ is decreasing in distance. The closer a
country is, the higher the optimal tari¤ levied on its imports. The intuition is simple.
Higher rents are made in nearby markets because a smaller share of revenue is lost in
transportation costs to serve those markets. Consequently, there are more rents available
to shift to domestic consumers using the tari¤.
As was the case in the solution for xij given by (2.7), it is always possible to set e¡ c
high enough to ensure that tˆij > 0. If tˆij < 0 then the optimal trade intervention is a
subsidy. In that case, free trade is not necessarily welfare maximizing. In the present
analysis we will be focusing on the standard case where free trade is best. For the optimal
tari¤ to be positive, it is necessary and su¢cient to make the following assumption:
A1. 0 < dk · (e¡ c) /3 for all dk 2 Di, all i 2 N .
This will be assumed to hold throughout. Intuitively, one would generally expect
trade agreements which entailed the removal of tari¤s to bring about an improvement of
welfare. The following result shows this intuition to hold in the present model.
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Proposition 2. Assume A1. Assume that in the absence of a FTA between countries
i and j then country i sets optimal tari¤s on imports from country j - tij = tˆij =
(e¡ c) /3¡dij, and vice versa. Assume that if countries i and j have a FTA then country
i adopts free trade on imports from country j - tij = 0 - and vice versa.
(i) The trade-production gain to two countries i and j from a bilateral FTA is given
by
¢wi =
1
72
(7 (e¡ c) + 3dij) ((e¡ c)¡ 3dij)
and is positive.
(ii) Trade-production gains from a bilateral FTA are decreasing in the distance be-
tween members i and j: d (¢wi) /d (dij) = ¡14 (e¡ c+ dij).
This proposition tells us that trade agreements are good for welfare, and that a
higher gain in welfare results from a larger tari¤ reduction. In the absence of a trade
agreement, Proposition 1 shows that tari¤s between regional members will be higher
than between countries of di¤erent regions. Proposition 2 shows that FTA formation
between regional members will yield higher production-trade gains than between countries
of di¤erent regions.
If production-trade gains were all that mattered, then Proposition 2 suggests the
world would move straight to free trade. Anecdotal discussions often reflect surprise that
the process of regionalism has not led more quickly towards free trade. One explanation
is that the costs of coordinating such agreements holds the process back. Sponsorship
costs, formalized in the next section, play exactly this role in the present model. But by
themselves such costs do not explain why FTAs are formed within a region. Proposition
2 indicates that regional agreements tend to form because they are worth more to their
members than non-regional agreements. Equivalently, greater benefits to regional FTA
formation can be set against the costs of sponsoring an agreement. This is the central
insight that will be developed in the following sections.
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3. Regions and Trade Agreements in a Non-cooperative Network
This section formalizes FTA formation in a world of regions. It shows how the formal
language of network formation can be adapted to model FTA formation when there is
a regional dimension to the model. The distinction that countries make between FTA
members in their own region and those from other regions is formalized by an adaptation
of Slikker and van den Nouweland’s (2000) partitioning of players in a network formation
game.
3.1. FTAs as Networks
The overall FTA structure is described by the graph (N , g), a pair of disjoint sets, where g
is a set of links in a (directed) network. The FTA structure of each region is described by
the subgraph (Rk, gRk), where gRk is a set of links called a subnetwork between countries
of region Rk.
If country i sponsors a FTA with a set of other countries Aj= {j1, ..., jl} then it sets
gijk = 1 for all jk 2 Aj. If gijk = 1 (or if gjki = 1) then there is said to be a link between
i and jk. A strategy of country i 2 N is a row vector gi = (gi1, ..., gin). The strategies of
all countries forms g = {g1, ..., gn}. Since N can be partitioned into regions, we can also
have g = {gR1 , ..., gRm}, where gRk is the set of links between members of region Rk.
There is a path from i to jk in g if i and j are linked, or if there exist countries
i1, ..., im distinct from each other such that they are all linked. A path in g between i and
j is denoted i
g$ j.5
A set Akµ N is a component of g if for all i and j in Ak there is a path between
them, and there does not exist a path between a country in Ak and one in N\Ak.
A network g is called connected if it has a unique component A, with all i 2 A = N .
A network that is not connected is referred to as disconnected. A network is called empty
if gij = gji = 0 for all i, j 2 N .
5This notation emphasises that for i and j to be linked there can either be a link from i to j, or from
j to i or both. This is sometimes referred to as a non-directed link.
12
Definition 1. (FTA Membership) A component Akµ N of g is a FTA: for all i 2 Ak, if
j 2 Ak then tij = 0. If j /2 Ak then tij = tˆij = (e¡ c) /3¡ dij.
Definition 2. (World FTA) If the network g is connected, then there is a world FTA.
Definition 3. (Only-regional FTA, complete-regional FTA and extra-regional FTA) If
there is a component for which all elements are in the same region, i, j 2 Ak µ Rk,
then Ak is an only-regional FTA; if the network gk is connected, then we say there is a
complete-regional FTA; if Ak Ã Rk then Ak is an extra-regional FTA.
Definition 1 gives FTA membership a definition in graph notation, and a convenient
graphical representation. Definition 2 then says that if all countries are in the same
component then there is a world FTA. If, on the other hand, all members of a component
are in the same region then the component is an only-regional FTA and if all countries
in a region are in the same FTA then we say there is a complete-regional FTA. Finally, if
FTA membership spans regions then there is said to be an extra-regional FTA. A country
that has no links with other countries is said to be in its own singleton component.
3.2. The Sponsor of a FTA
For a trade agreement to come about, we will say that it must have a sponsor. A sponsor
must pay a sponsorship cost for setting up a FTA. If none of the countries are already in
an FTA, then the sponsorship cost is proportional to the number of proposed members.
The function ·i () measures the sponsorship fee paid by country i for an agreement, and
it is assumed to be linear in the number of FTA members. Formally, country i pays a cost
·i (1) for each link that it forms. So the sponsorship fee for an agreement with countries
Aj= {j1, ..., jl} is ·i (|Aj|). It is understood that the FTA is multilateral. So each jk 2 Aj
adopts free trade with each other member of Aj, not just with country i.
What happens if the set of countries Aj= {j1, ..., jl} with whom country i proposes
to sponsor an FTA are themselves already in an FTA?. Then we will say that country
i only has to pay the cost of a single link ·i (1). If country i is itself already in a FTA,
entailing the set of countries Ak = {i1, .., i, .., il}, then we will say that country i sponsors
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a FTA between Aj and Ak and that again the sponsorship cost is just ·i (1).6
Because a country pays a sponsorship fee for each agreement that it proposes, we will
want a way of keeping track of the total amount that each country pays in sponsorship
fees. To this end, define ´¾i (g) = |{k 2 N |gik = 1}| as the number of countries with
which i maintains direct links. Then the total sponsorship cost paid by a country is given
by ·i (´¾i (g)) or ´
¾
i (g)·i (1).
As well as wishing to calculate the costs of FTA formation to each country, we
will also want to calculate the benefits. Because in general these vary across regions,
we will need to distinguish between the number of members in each. Define ´i (g) =¯¯¯n
i 2 Rk, j 2 Rk
¯¯¯
j
g$ i
o
[ {i}
¯¯¯
i 6= j as the number of countries in the same region as
country i and on the same path. Recall that Di contains the set of distinct distances
dk of other countries from country i. Define ´
dk
i (g) =
¯¯¯n
i 2 Rk, j 2 Rj
¯¯¯
dij = dk, j
g$ i
o¯¯¯
,i 6= j, as the number of other countries j 6= i at a distance dij = dk > 0 on the same path
as country i. Let
n
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dk
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g)
o
= Hi (g) be the complete set of
membership variables ´dki (g).
In the three region model, where each region is assumed to be at the vertex of an
equilateral triangle, we have a particularly simple representation. All countries not in the
same region as country i are at the same distance away. So if i 2 Rk then dij = d > 0 for
all j /2 Rk and a single scalar which we can call ´di (g) gives the total number of countries
not in Rk with which country i is linked.
The process of agreement formation will be much easier to formalize if we know
6Care should be taken to justify these assumptions about sponsorship costs. At its simplest, when a
country sponsors a bilateral agreement it pays for a set of border controls that verify the origin of goods
from an FTA partner. (In the absence of an agreement no such system is needed because all goods carry
duty.) Once goods are verifiable by one partner then they are assumed to be verifiable by all at no extra
cost. Hence if country i sponsors an agreement with |Aj | other countries then the sponsorship cost is
assumed to be · (|Aj |) and not ·
³
|Aj |(|Aj |+1)
´
. If country i sponsors an agreement with another FTA,
then it only has to pay for the cost of making its own good verifiable at the border of the FTA to which
it applies, so the cost is just · (1). If country i sponsors an agreement between its own FTA and another
one, then it must pay to make its own goods verifiable to the new FTA. But since a standardised system
is already operated within its own FTA, country i only has to pay to make the single standard verifiable
by the new FTA, again at a cost of · (1). Finally, in a world of free trade, there will be no need for
verification of origin because all goods will pass through borders duty free. But there will be need of a
verification system to ensure that the system is not being cheated upon. Implicitly it is assumed that
the costs of operating such a system are the same as the costs of verification, an admittedly bold but
simplifying assumption.
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that any agreement which some country i proposes to sponsor will be accepted by all
the proposed partners. Then the proposal of an agreement will be synonymous with its
formation. Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, the production-trade gains to a FTA
are always positive. The following result uses this fact to establish that the proposes of a
FTA will always accept it.
Proposition 3. Assume A1. If country i proposes to sponsor a FTA with a set of other
countries Aj= {j1, ..., jl} then all countries in the set Aj would obtain positive production-
trade payo¤s from the proposed FTA and would therefore accept. This holds whether or
not the set of countries Aj= {j1, ..., jl} are themselves already in an FTA and whether or
not country i is itself already in an FTA.
The following result shows that the network structure gives rise to an ordinary coali-
tion structure of the form C = {A1,A2, ...,Am}.
Lemma 2. An FTA structure is a partition of the set of countries N : Ai \ Aj = ;;
[i2CAi = N .
Thus, an FTA structure is like the cooperation structure modelled by Myerson (1977).
We have a conventional coalition structure rather than a network. But as we shall see, the
network terminology of link formation is helpful because it enables us to model equilibrium
very conveniently in the manner of a non-cooperative network.
As acknowledged in the introduction, this formalization of FTAs is highly stylized.
Now that the model has been introduced, it should be clear that one of the simplifications
made here could be dealt with by making the sponsorship of agreements more balanced
between members, although the modelling framework would become significantly more
complex to take this on board.
A second complication not mentioned in the introduction is that in the real world the
network of agreements is much more complex, with partners of an FTA being members of
other mutually exclusive FTAs, as shown diagrammatically by Bhagwati and Panagaraya’s
(199X) “spaghetti bowl”. The simplified structure that results in the present model can
essentially be traced to the assumption that sponsors negotiate on behalf of all their FTA
partners to join other FTAs. Without it, countries i and j in a given FTA could each
15
sponsor agreements with two other separate FTAs, potentially resulting in much more
complex equilibrium paths. However, this assumption reflects the widely held view that
it is easier to negotiate between blocks than between individual countries. Indeed Article
XXIV of the GATT charter, which has now been adopted by the WTO and sets out
the rules on FTA formation, states exactly this rationale for allowing trade blocks. The
analysis of this paper present will show how regional trade blocks can prevail even under
the GATT/WTO’s assumed modus operandi.
3.3. Payo¤s to FTA Formation
The production-trade payo¤s wi, given by the function (2.8), will now be adapted for use
as a payo¤ function in a FTA formation game. Let i 2 Ai.
Lemma 3. Let xij be given by (2.7). Then the function (2.8) can be expressed in the
form
wi = w
³
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dk
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g) ;°
´
,
or equivalently
wi = w (Hi (g) ;°) .
To gain greater insight into this result, look at the expanded form of the payo¤
function w (Hi (g) ;°):
w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g) , ...;°
¢
= ´i (g)
µ
3
8
(e¡ c)2
¶
+(|N | ¡ |Ai|)
µ
5
18
(e¡ c)2
¶
+´d1i (g)
µ
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + d1) (e¡ c¡ d1)
¶
...
+´dzi (g)
µ
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + dz) (e¡ c¡ dz)
¶
.
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The expression is parametric except for the membership variables because tari¤s have
been substituted for, using either the optimal tari¤ formula (Proposition 1) where no
agreement exists, or zero tari¤s where an agreement exists.
The first line shows the payo¤ to production and trade with FTA members that are
in the same region, the number of which is given by ´i (g). No distance parameter appears
on this line because countries in the same region are assumed to have the same location.
The second line gives the payo¤ to production and trade with all countries not in country
i’s FTA. Notice that when optimal tari¤s are in place, the volume of trade is exactly the
same between all non-members of the FTA, regardless of their distance. The remaining
lines measure the production-trade gains from FTA members at all distances dk 2 Di.7
Having derived a convenient short-hand to write wi in terms of regional FTA mem-
bership, it is now possible to evaluate the gains to country i from FTA formation with
other regional members and countries from outside the region. The following result shows
that as long as optimal tari¤s are positive then an increase in membership of country
i’s FTA carries production-trade gains to country i. The result also shows that more
production-trade gains are derived the closer are the new members.
Let ¢´i (g) denote a unit increase in ´i (g) from any level and let ¢´
dk
i (g) denote
a unit increase in ´dki (g) from any level. Let ¢w/¢´i (g) and ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) measure the
impact on w (Hi (g) ;°) of a unit increase in ´i (g) and ´
dk
i (g) respectively.
Lemma 4. Assume A1.
(i) The terms ¢w/¢´i (g) and ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) are positive and constant, (where dk is
any element of the set Di) and are independent of ´i (g) and ´
dk
i (g).
(ii) Let dj be the smallest element of Di, let dl 2 Di be the largest element, and let
dk 2 Di be any other element such that dj < dk < dl. Then
¢w/¢´i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dj
i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dl
i (g) ¸ 0.
7To see why no distance parameters appear in the second line showing production-trade gains with
non-members of the FTA, use the expression for the optimal tari¤ (Proposition 1) in the expression for
output (2.7) and notice that the distance parameter cancels.
If optimal tari¤s are removed and tari¤s are set to zero then the distance parameters appear. This
explains why the distance parameters do appear on the remaining lines.
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Lemma 4 extends Proposition 2 from bilateral to multilateral agreements. Because
there are no terms of trade externalities in the model, Lemma 4 essentially establishes that
the production-trade payo¤ to forming multilateral FTAs is a multiple of the production-
trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement.
Assumption A1 ensures that optimal tari¤s are positive. Part (i) of Lemma 4 estab-
lishes that ¢w/¢´i (g) and ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) are constant and do not depend on the initial
levels of ´i (g) and ´
dk
i (g). This is convenient because it means that the production-trade
benefit of changes in FTA membership can be evaluated depending only on the distance
between members. Consequently, the production-trade gains of any change in FTA mem-
bership, regional or non-regional, can be captured using the notation ¢w/¢´i (g) and
¢w/¢´dki (g). For example, the e¤ect of an increase in ´i (g) from y
1 to y2 is given by
(y2 ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g).
Part (ii) of Lemma 4 shows that production-trade gains of trade block expansion are
greater for closer countries. It is possible to understand why by looking at the payo¤
function w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g) , ...;°
¢
. Notice that the production trade payo¤ from
regional members, at 3
8
(e¡ c)2, is greater than the production-trade payo¤ from countries
where there is no agreement, at 5
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(e¡ c)2. The proof then shows that for any two
countries joining an FTA, the production-trade payo¤ lies between these two levels. The
intuition is straight forward. Because tari¤s between closer countries are higher, their
removal brings about a relatively large increase in production-trade gains. Formally,
this follows from Proposition 1, which shows optimal tari¤s to be declining in distance,
and Proposition 2(ii), which shows in turn that the production-trade gains to a bilateral
agreement are declining in distance. As long as signing a FTA entails removal of positive
tari¤s, then there must be a gain from forming an agreement. But this is ensured by
assumption A1, which guarantees that optimal tari¤s are positive.
3.3.1. Three Regions on an Equilateral Triangle Again
As mentioned above, when using the three region model only two parameters are needed
to describe FTA membership from the point of view of country i. These parameters are
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´i (g) and ´
d
i (g), which give regional and non-regional membership respectively. Nothing
more complicated than the 3-region model, based on an equilateral triangle, is needed to
motivate the tendency to form regional agreements, and the main results will be based
on this simplified special case. The model will be developed at a full level of generality in
the next version of this paper.
3.4. FTA Formation with Sponsorship Costs
Now that the production-trade payo¤s of FTA formation have been determined, these
can be used in the payo¤s of a noncooperative network formation game.
The parameters in the vector ° are held constant throughout, so from now on the
function w (Hi (g) ;°) will be written w (Hi (g)). Using this brief form for production
trade payo¤s, define each country’s overall payo¤ function ªi : G ! R as follows:
ªi (g) = Ã (Hi (g) , ´
¾
i (g)) (3.1)
= w (Hi (g))¡ ·i (´¾i (g))
When optimal tari¤s are positive w () is increasing in ´i (g) , and weakly increasing in
´dki (g) 2 Hi (g). So for the purposes of the analysis (Hi (g) , ´¾i (g)) is increasing in ´i (g)
and weakly increasing in ´dki (g). The function ·i () is a linear function of ´
¾
i (g), the scalar
measuring the number of FTAs sponsored by country i. Sponsorship costs are invariant
to the distance between members.8 Hence the overall payo¤ to the network formation
game is given by the balance between the production-trade payo¤s to an agreement and
its sponsorship costs.
3.5. FTAs in Equilibrium as Nash Networks
With payo¤s to the network formation game now specified, we can define the notion of
equilibrium, which will be that of a Nash network. Given a network g 2 G, let g¡i denote
the network obtained when all of country i’s links are removed. Then the network g can
be written as g = gi © g¡i., where © denotes that g is formed as the union of the links in
8Asymmetries in the value of links across players have also been considered in network formation
models by Myerson (1980) and Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000), but in a cooperative network
framework.
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gi and g¡i. The strategy gi is a best response of country i to g¡i if there does not exist a
strategy g0 for which
ªi (g
0
i © g¡i) ¸ ªi (gi © g¡i) for all g0i 2 Gi.
The set of all country i’s best responses to g¡i is denoted BRi (g¡i). A network g =
(g1, ..., gn) is a Nash network if gi 2 BRi (g¡i) for each i.
This definition of equilibrium was introduced by Bala and Goyal (2000). It is a
straightforward application of the standard notion of Nash equilibrium to a noncoopera-
tive network setting. A network is in a state of equilibrium if none of the agents, countries
in the setting of this present paper, has an incentive to deviate. In the present setting,
deviation would entail a country breaking a link by withdrawing its sponsorship of a FTA.
Bala and Goyal show how this notion of equilibrium can be used in a dynamic setting.
Here in this present paper the focus will be exclusively on a dynamic equilibrium path
where a Nash network exists in each period. The dynamic process is very simple. It is
initialized with the empty network. Countries are assumed to make naive best responses,
taking as given the network in the previous period. Initializing with the empty network
g in the period t = 0, along the equilibrium path, a Nash network exists in every period
t = 1, 2, ...,1.
4. The 3-Region FTA in Equilibrium
This section uses the simple 3-region model to present the main results of the paper.
Nothing more complex than the 3-region model is needed to show why trade blocks may
be regional. So let |C| = 3. Countries are located at the vertices of an equilateral triangle.
For all countries not sharing the same region, i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j, let the distance
between them be given by the same parameter dij = d > 0. Then the variable ´di (g)
measures the total number of non-regional members in country i’s FTA. (The variable
´i (g) gives the number of regional members as before.)
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4.1. Production-Trade Payo¤s, Sponsorship Costs and Overall Payo¤s in a
Network Game
One of the main advantages of using a 3-region model is that it keeps the overall payo¤
function as simple as possible. The overall payo¤ function takes the form
Ã (Hi (g) , ´
¾
i (g)) = Ã
¡
´i (g) , ´
d
i (g) , ´
¾
i (g)
¢
.
Equilibrium analysis will centre on showing network configurations from which there is
no incentive to deviate, given assumptions about the relationship between production-
trade benefits to network formation and sponsorship costs. So we will want a method of
examining the change in payo¤s to all possible strategic alternatives open to a country.
To develop such a method, let ¢´¾i (g) denote a unit increase of ´
¾
i (g). Then the
change in the overall payo¤ to the sponsorship of any given agreement can be evaluated.
For example, suppose that country i has already sponsored agreements with z countries.
To be clear, formally country i has sponsored z links with other countries. And through
these agreements country i is in a FTA with y1 other regional countries and y1d countries
outside the region. Then the payo¤ to the sponsorship of an additional agreement, which
will enlarge the FTA to include y2 > y1 countries from the region and y2d > y
1
d from
outside the region is given by
Ã
¡
y2, y2d, z +¢´
¾
i (g)
¢¡ Ã ¡y1, y1d, z¢
=
¡
y2 ¡ y1¢¢w/¢´i (g) + ¡y2d ¡ y1d¢¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·i (¢´¾i (g)) .
The left hand side takes the di¤erence between overall payo¤s under the two network
structures. The first term on the right hand side shows the production-trade gains to an
increase in regional members of the FTA. The second term shows the production-trade
gains to an increase in non-regional members. The third term shows the sponsorship
costs of setting up the additional agreement. Taken together, these terms show how the
production-trade gains balance against the sponsorship costs of an agreement.
It begins to become clear when payo¤s are presented in this way that the sponsorship
of some agreements will more than compensate for the sponsorship costs whilst others will
not. Recall from Lemma 4 that the production-trade payo¤s to a regional FTA are higher
than to a non-regional FTA. From this, it is easy to imagine sponsorship costs at a level
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where regional agreements of a given size are worthwhile but non-regional agreements
are not. The following result formalizes this idea by looking at sponsorship costs across
a range of levels and their implications for the incentive to sponsor FTAs, regional and
non-regional. It is important to keep in mind when looking at this result, however, that it
evaluates the incentive to form a FTA where none are pre-existing. As we shall see later,
the incentive to form new FTAs from existing ones are greater than the incentive to get
FTAs o¤ the ground in the first place. A complete-regional FTA is one which includes all
member so the region but no other countries; Ak = Rk for all Ak 2 C, Rk 2 P . A world
FTA is one for which there is a single component that contains all countries; A = N .
Lemma 5. Assume A1. Assume that in period t = 0 the network g is empty.
(i) Let the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in the same
region be lower than the sponsorship cost. If there are no existing FTAs then no FTA is
worth sponsoring. Formally, ¢w/¢´i (g) < · (1) ) Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
< Ã (1, 0, 0)
for 1 < r · y1, 0 · y1d · n¡ r.
(ii) Let the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in a
di¤erent region be higher than the sponsorship cost. Even if there are no FTAs, then the
payo¤ to sponsorship of a world FTA is higher than the payo¤ to sponsorship of any other
FTA. Formally, ¢w/¢´di (g) > · (1) ) Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) ¸ Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
,
for r ¸ y1 ¸ 1, n¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 0, holding with strict inequality if and only if y1 < r and/or
y1d < n¡ r.
(iii) Let the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in the
same region be higher than the sponsorship cost. But let the production-trade payo¤
to a bilateral agreement with a country in a di¤erent region be lower than (or equal
to) than the sponsorship cost. If there are no existing FTAs then sponsorship of a
complete-regional FTA yields a higher payo¤ than sponsorship of any other agreement.
Formally, ¢w/¢´di (g) < · (1) < ¢w/¢´i (g) ) Ã (r, 0, r ¡ 1) > Ã (r, n¡ r, n¡ 1) and
Ã (r, 0, r ¡ 1) > Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢, for r > y1 ¸ 1, n¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 1.
In a situation where there are no FTAs already existing, Lemma 5 shows the FTA
structure that will yield the highest payo¤ from sponsorship. If the production-trade
payo¤s of a bilateral agreement are lower than the sponsorship cost even for an agreement
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with regional neighbors, then no country has an incentive to sponsor a FTA. There will
then certainly exist no incentive to sponsor a FTA with countries outside the region,
because this entails the removal of lower tari¤s, and therefore smaller production-trade
gains. Conversely, if the production-trade payo¤s are higher than the sponsorship cost of
a FTA with a country in another region then a FTA with close regional neighbors will
certainly be worth sponsoring.
It is when costs are at an intermediate level that the incentives show scope for re-
gionalism. The highest payo¤ is yielded when a country sponsors a FTA that consists
only of its regional neighbors and not more distant nations. In part (iii) of Lemma 5 it is
assumed that the costs of production-trade payo¤s of sponsoring a FTA with a country in
the same region are above the sponsorship costs. Therefore, it is immediately clear that
it will be worth sponsoring a FTA with regional neighbors. But sponsorship costs are
above the production-trade payo¤s of a FTA with countries outside the region. So from
a situation where a country did sponsor an extra-regional FTA, it would gain more from
withdrawing its sponsorship of an agreement with those more distant nations than from
the production-trade gains of maintaining it. In this situation, the sponsorship costs lie
between the relatively large gains from removing higher mutual tari¤s with close neigh-
bors and the smaller gains from removing lower mutual tari¤s with countries that are
further away.
Lemma 5 focuses exclusively on the payo¤s to a country when it is the sole sponsor
of a FTA. It will become clear in the analysis of equilibrium that the analysis reaches
much further than just this restrictive situation. It will be shown that in equilibrium
any given FTA can only have one sponsor. But to make analysis of the equilibrium path
easier, it will be helpful to look at how the incentives to sponsor a world FTA change
when starting not from a situation where there are no FTAs but from one where there are
complete-regional FTAs already in existence. The incentives to sponsor an extra-regional
FTA, given that a complete-regional FTA already exists, are analyzed in the next result.
Lemma 6. Assume A1.
Let the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a single country in a
di¤erent region be lower than the sponsorship cost. Assume that a complete-regional
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agreement exists in every region Rk 2 P. An extra-regional FTA (formed with a single
link) is worth sponsoring if the production-trade payo¤s to a FTA with more than one
country in a di¤erent region are higher than the sponsorship cost. (If no FTA already
exists in another region Rj then an extra-regional agreement is not worth sponsoring.)
Formally, yd1¢w/¢´
d
i (g) > · (1) > ¢w/¢´
d
i (g)) Ã
¡
y1, ay
d
1 , y1 + a¡ 1
¢
> Ã (y1, 0, y1 ¡ 1),
for r ¸ y1 ¸ 1, r ¸ y1 > 1, a ¸ 1
If there are enough other countries from another region already in a FTA then the
production-trade benefits may overcome the sponsorship costs, even though these costs
are too high to make an agreement with a single other country in that region worthwhile.
The last part of the Lemma, shown in brackets, is a re-statement of Lemma 5(ii), to
emphasize the contrasting outcomes depending on whether or not a FTA exists in the
other region.
4.2. Equilibrium Paths; Are FTAs Stepping Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?
This subsection takes its title from the famous question posed by Bhagwati (1992). In
the way that it will be answered below, the question should in fact be posed as ‘When
are FTAs stepping stones and when are they stumbling blocks in the path to free trade?’
As argued in the introduction of this present paper, trade blocks in the real world are
regional. In this light, the question is whether the regional blocks presently existing will
ultimately promote world free trade.
The term regionalism usually describes a situation where countries in a region form
a club or agreement, but where membership does not extend beyond regional boundaries.
For a corresponding analytical definition that will be useful in the present context, let
regionalism be a situation where all regions have a complete FTA but where there are
no extra-regional FTAs; in the network g there is a connected subnetwork gk for each
Rk 2 C, but gij = gji = 0 for all i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj. The next proposition presents the main
result of the paper.
Proposition 4. Assume A1.
(i) If the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in the same
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region is lower than the sponsorship cost then on the equilibrium path no FTA will exist
at any point in time.
(ii) If the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in a dif-
ferent region is higher than the sponsorship cost then on the equilibrium path there is
world free trade at every point in time.
(iii) On the equilibrium path there is regionalism in the first period if the following
conditions hold:
(a) production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in the same region
is higher than the sponsorship cost
(b) production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a country in a di¤erent
region is lower than the sponsorship cost.
(iv) (Regional trade blocks are stepping blocks to free trade) On the equilibrium path
there is regionalism in the first period followed by world free trade from the second period
onwards if the following conditions hold:
(a) the production-trade payo¤ to an extra-regional FTA with all countries in a
di¤erent region is higher than the sponsorship cost;
(b) the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a single country in a
di¤erent region is lower than the sponsorship cost.
(c) the production-trade payo¤ to a bilateral agreement with a single country in the
same region is higher than the sponsorship cost.
If the production-trade payo¤ to an extra-regional FTA with all countries in a dif-
ferent region is lower than the sponsorship cost then on the equilibrium path there is
regionalism at every point in time.
Proposition 4 shows that the equilibrium path to free trade may indeed exhibit a
period of regionalism (Proposition 4(iii)&(iv)), presenting the possibility of an encouraging
answer to Bhagwati’s question. This outcome depends on sponsorship costs being high
enough so that extra-regional agreements are not worth sponsoring between individual
nations, but are worth sponsoring between existing FTAs. With costs slightly higher,
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even an agreement between regional FTAs is not worth sponsoring and the FTA structure
stalls at regionalism (Proposition 4(iii)&(iv)). Obviously, if the sponsorship costs are
prohibitive of even a FTA between close regional neighbors then none will be sponsored at
all (Proposition 4(i)). On the other hand, with sponsorship costs that are su¢ciently low
there will be a move straight to free trade, bypassing regionalism altogether (Proposition
4(ii)).
5. Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper has been to show that regionalism can arise in equilibrium.
That is, countries may choose to form regional trade agreements rather than move all the
way to free trade. Depending on the level of costs associated with sponsoring a FTA,
regionalism may be a temporary phenomenon or it may lead on to free trade. Less
interestingly, when costs are high then no FTAs will form and when costs are low there
will be world free trade.
The analysis presented here appears to present a fairly optimistic picture for the fu-
ture of trade liberalization through regional trade block formation. One significant caveat
should be noted to this conclusion. Terms-of-trade benefits to expanding the relative size
of an agreement have been suppressed in the present analysis by the assumption that
goods enter preferences independently. In the analysis of Furusawa and Konishi (2002),
customs union formation can prevent free trade because it is not in the interests of a large
powerful block of countries that obtain relative terms-of-trade gains through the size of
their agreement.9 It appears that this type of terms-of-trade e¤ect could overthrow the
prediction of free trade as an outcome in the present analysis.
There are a number of extensions to this work that suggest themselves immediately.
One straightforward extension to appear in the next version of this paper is to present
the results of this paper for any number of regions. A more substantive extension would
be to loosen the admittedly stringent assumptions concerning sponsorship costs of FTAs
9Customs union formation entails the joint maximisation of welfare. Note that when goods enter
preferences independently then customs union formation is no di¤erent from FTA formation. A country
can fully internalise the gains through tari¤ setting because it exports a good to the world market which
has no substitute.
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to enable an agreement to be sponsored by more than one country. Another would be to
generalize the utility function that gives the production-trade payo¤s to FTA formation.
Also, if some way of allowing terms-of-trade e¤ects to enter the analysis could be found
then this might enable the conclusions of the present paper, where low costs of trade block
formation lead to free trade, to be overturned.
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A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First rearrange the expression for CSi as follows:
CSi =
X
j2N
1
2
(pij ¡ cij) xij
=
1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ xij ¡ cij)xij
=
1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ cij)xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij
=
1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ c¡ tij ¡ dij)xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij
where the second line follows by (2.4), and the fourth line follows by (2.2).
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Using this, the expressions for TRi, DRi, and (2.6) in (2.8) yields
w =
1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ c¡ tij ¡ dij)xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij
+x2ii +
X
j2N
tijxij +
X
j2N
dijxij +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji
=
1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ c) xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
tijxij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
dijxij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij
+x2ii +
X
j2N
tijxij +
X
j2N
dijxij +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji
=
1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ c) xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
tijxij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
dijxij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij
+x2ii +
X
j2N
tijxij +
X
j2N
dijxij +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji
Now rearranging terms,
w =
X
j2N
(e¡ c)xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ c¡ tij ¡ dij) xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij
+x2ii +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji
=
X
j2N
(e¡ c)xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
(e¡ cij) xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij + x
2
ii +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji
=
X
j2N
(e¡ c)xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
(pij ¡ cij)xij ¡
X
j2N
x2ij + x
2
ii +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji
= (e¡ c)
X
j2N
xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij ¡
X
j2N/{i}
x2ij +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji.
where the third line uses (2.2). ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. Using the expression for w obtained in Lemma 1, the govern-
ment of country i solves the following problem to set the optimal tari¤ on imports from
country j;
max
tij
w = (e¡ c)
X
j2N
xij ¡ 3
2
X
j2N
x2ij +
X
j2N
x2ji.
Because, by (2.7), xji is not a function of tij (the tari¤ set by country i does not a¤ect
production in other countries), the derivatives with respect to tij of all the terms under
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the last summation are equal to zero. Given that ¡ (xij)2 is concave, and by (2.7) xij is a
linear function of tij, the objective function w is concave in tij, all j 2 N . So there must
exist a unique solution for tˆij. Write the first order condition as
dw
dtij
= (e¡ c) dxij
dtij
¡ 3
X
j2N
(xij)
dxij
dtij
= 0.
Then, using the fact that dxij/dtij = ¡1/2, simplifying and rearranging obtains tˆij =
(e¡ c) /3¡ dij. It is immediate that if d < (e¡ c) /3 then tˆij > 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Country i’s production-trade payo¤ is given by
wi = (e¡ c)
X
j2N
xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij ¡
X
j2N/{i}
x2ij +
X
j2N/{i}
x2ji.
By (2.7), if dij = dji and tij = tji then xij = xji and the last two terms cancel, leaving
wi = (e¡ c)
X
j2N
xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij.
Using (2.7),
wi =
X
j2N
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + tij + dij) (e¡ c¡ tij ¡ dij) .
Now let countries i and j form a FTA. Using tij = tˆij for the pre-agreement tari¤, and
tij = 0 for the post agreement tari¤ in wi, take discrete di¤erences to work out the welfare
gain:
¢wi =
1
72
(7 (e¡ c) + 3dij) ((e¡ c)¡ 3dij) .
Under the assumptions that e¡ c > 0, and tij = tˆij = (e¡ c) /3¡ dij > 0, so ¢wi > 0.
(ii) Immediate by di¤erentiation. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. By Definition 1, all countries in J set tij with all other
countries in j and with the sponsor, country i. By Proposition 1, each country in j
gains ¢wi > 0 for each other country in the agreement, and pays no sponsorship cost.
Therefore, it is in the interest of each country in the set J to join the FTA proposed by
i. ¤
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Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not. [i2CAi = N is trivial as unilateralists are singleton
components. To see that Ai \ Aj = ;, suppose not. Suppose that i 2 Ai and i 2 Aj.
This may be the case for one of the following reasons. Either i proposed to sponsor
Ai and Aj. But in that case all members of Ai\ {i} and Aj\ {i} must be in the same
FTA; a contradiction. Or i was already in one agreement, assume Ai, and proposed to
sponsor an agreement with the members of Aj. But then, by assumption, if i’s proposal
were accepted all members of Ai must have joined Aj at the same time; a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that i was already in one agreement, assume Ai, but came into Aj as a
result of an agreement proposed by another country. But then if i entered Aj in this way,
then so must all Ai\ {i}; a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3. For convenience, define the following piece of notation. Let gij =
max {gij, gji}. Note that, by (2.7), tij = tji and dij = dji, it is the case that xij = xji for
all i, j 2 N (independent of whether gij = 0 or gij = 1). Consequently, the function w
can be written in the form
wi = (e¡ c)
X
j2N
xij ¡ 1
2
X
j2N
x2ij.
Let xdkij
¡
gij
¢
represent (2.7) where the superscript dk denotes that country j is at
distance dk > 0 from country i; i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j. We substitute for (2.7) explicitly in
the step after this. But to see how the structure of the new function arises, it is helpful
to note the following intermediate step. Recall that gij 2 {0, 1}, where tij is set optimally
according to Proposition 1 if gij = 0 and free trade is adopted if and only if gij = 1. As
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xdkij
¡
gij
¢
depends only on gij and dk, the function wi can be partitioned accordingly:
wi = w
³
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dk
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g) ;°
´
= ´i (g)
µ
(e¡ c) xij (1)¡ 1
2
xij (1)
2
¶
+(r ¡ ´i (g))
µ
(e¡ c) xij (0)¡ 1
2
xij (0)
2
¶
+´d1i (g)
µ
(e¡ c)xd1ij (1)¡
1
2
xd1ij (1)
2
¶
+
¡
±1i ¡ ´d1i (g)
¢µ
(e¡ c) xd1ij (0)¡
1
2
xd1ij (0)
2
¶
...
+´dzi (g)
µ
(e¡ c) xdzij (1)¡
1
2
xdzij (1)
2
¶
+
¡
±zi ¡ ´dzi (g)
¢µ
(e¡ c)xdzij (0)¡
1
2
xdzij (0)
2
¶
where the absence of a superscript in the terms xij (1) and xij (0) denotes that i, j 2 Rk.
Now substitute explicitly for (2.7). First note that if i, j 2 Rk then dij = 0. Also,
if gij = 1 then tij = 0 and, by (2.7), xij (1) = (e¡ c) /2. If g¯ij = 0 then tij = (e¡ c) /3
and so xij (0) = (e¡ c) /3. Analogously, by (2.7), xdkij (1) = (e¡ c¡ dk) /2. And, by
Proposition 1, use tˆij = e¡c3 ¡ dk and (2.7) to obtain xdkij (0) = (e¡ c) /3. Making these
substitutions, we can rewrite the function w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g) , ...;°
¢
as
w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ..., ´
dz
i (g) , ...;°
¢
= ´i (g)
µ
3
8
(e¡ c)2
¶
+(r ¡ ´i (g))
µ
5
18
(e¡ c)2
¶
+´d1i (g)
µ
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + d1) (e¡ c¡ d1)
¶
+
¡
±k1 ¡ ´d1i (g)
¢µ 5
18
(e¡ c)2
¶
...
+´dzi (g)
µ
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + dz) (e¡ c¡ dz)
¶
+
¡
±kz ¡ ´dzi (g)
¢µ 5
18
(e¡ c)2
¶
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Now, using the facts that r+
P
dk2Di ±ki = |N | and ´i (g) +
P
dk2Di ´
dk
i (g) = |Ai| we
can simplify further by writing
w
¡
´i (g¯) , ´
d1
i (g¯) , ..., ´
dz
i (g¯) , ...;°
¢
= ´i (g¯)
µ
3
8
(e¡ c)2
¶
+(|N | ¡ |Ai|)
µ
5
18
(e¡ c)2
¶
+´d1i (g¯)
µ
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + d1) (e¡ c¡ d1)
¶
...
+´dzi (g¯)
µ
1
8
(3 (e¡ c) + dz) (e¡ c¡ dz)
¶
.
¤.
Proof of Lemma 4: (i) To show that ¢w/¢´i (g) is constant, begin by noting that
although ´i (g) is a discrete variable, the function w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ...´
dz
i (g) ;°
¢
is con-
tinuous in ´i (g). Treating ´i (g) as a continuous variable in a compact set, it is possible
to calculate the derivative of w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ...´
dz
i (g) ;°
¢
with respect to ´i (g);
@w
@´i (g)
=
7
72
(e¡ c)2
As the expression for @w/@´i (g) is parametric, the e¤ect on w of a discrete change in ´i
is given by
¢w =
µ
7
72
(e¡ c)2
¶
¢´i (g)
This holds at any ´i (g), as required. As (e¡ c) > 0 by assumption, ¢w/¢´i (g) > 0.
To show that ¢w/¢´dki (g) is constant, follow the same procedure. Calculate the
derivative of w
¡
´i (g) , ´
d1
i (g) , ...´
dz
i (g) ;°
¢
with respect to ´dki (g):
@w
@´dki (g)
=
1
72
(7 (e¡ c) + 3dk) (e¡ c¡ 3dk)
As the expression for @w/@´dki (g) is parametric, the e¤ect on w of a discrete change in
´dki is given by
¢w =
1
72
(7 (e¡ c) + 3dk) (e¡ c¡ 3dk)¢´dki (g)
33
Again, this holds at any ´i (g) as required. By A1, (e¡ c) > 3dk and therefore¢w/¢´dki (g) >
0.
(ii) Show that ¢w/¢´i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dj
i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dl
i (g) ¸ 0.
First establish that ¢w/¢´i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dj
i (g). From (i) we know that in general
¢w
¢´dki (g)
=
1
72
(7 (e¡ c) + 3dk) (e¡ c¡ 3dk)
where dk is any element of Di. Expanding the brackets,
¢w
¢´dki (g)
=
1
72
¡
7 (e¡ c)2 ¡ 18 (e¡ c) dk ¡ 9d2k
¢
Notice that ¢w/¢´dki (g) is declining in dk, attaining its maximum for dk = 0. So
¢w/¢´i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) for all dk 2 Di and, in particular,¢w/¢´i (g) > ¢w/¢´dji (g).
Next, establish that ¢w/¢´dji (g) > ¢w/¢´
dk
i (g) > ¢w/¢´
dl
i (g). But this follows
immediately by the fact that ¢w/¢´dki (g) is declining in dk, and that by assumption
dj < dk < dl.
Finally, it must be established that ¢w/¢´dli (g) ¸ 0. The root for ¢w/¢´dki (g) = 0
is dk = (e¡ c) /3. To see this, use dk = (e¡ c) /3 in ¢w/¢´dki (g) to obtain
¢w
¢´dki (g)
=
1
72
Ã
7 (e¡ c)2 ¡ 18
3
(e¡ c)2 ¡ 9
µ
e¡ c
3
¶2!
= 0.
But by A1, 0 < dk · (e¡ c) /3. The result follows. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. By A1, ¢w/¢´i (g) > ¢w/¢´di (g) ¸ 0 (Lemma 4).
(i) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary that
there does exist a FTA that is worth sponsoring. For this to be the case the overall payo¤
to sponsoring such an agreement must be higher than autarchy. Then there exist values
of y1 and y1d, where r ¸ y1 > 1, n ¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 0, for which Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
>
Ã (1, 0, 0). This implies
Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢¡ Ã (1, 0, 0)
= (y1 ¡ 1)¢w/¢´i (g) + yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢
> 0.
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But
(y1 ¡ 1)¢w/¢´i (g) + yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢
= (y1 ¡ 1)¢w/¢´i (g) + yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢
· (1)
< (y1 ¡ 1)¢w/¢´i (g) + yd1¢w/¢´i (g)¡
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢
· (1)
=
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢
(¢w/¢´i (g)¡ · (1)) ,
and by assumption ¢w/¢´i (g) < · (1) so
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢
(¢w/¢´i (g)¡ · (1)) < 0; con-
tradiction.
(ii) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary that
sponsorship of some FTA other than the world FTA yields a higher payo¤. Then Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) <
Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
for all values of y1 and y1d, where r ¸ y1 ¸ 1, n ¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 0.
This implies
Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1))¡ Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢
= (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
< 0.
But
(r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
= (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
> (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´di (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
=
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
,
and by assumption ¢w/¢´di (g) > · (1) so
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢ ¸ 0; con-
tradiction. Clearly, if y1 = r and y1d = n¡r then
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
= 0
and Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) = Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢. But if y1 < r and/or y1d < n¡ r then¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
> 0. The result follows.
(ii) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary that
sponsorship of some FTA other than the complete-regional FTA yields a higher payo¤.
Then Ã (r, 0, (r ¡ 1)) < Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢ for some values of y1 and y1d, where r >
y1 ¸ 1, and n¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 0. This implies
Ã (r, 0, (r ¡ 1))¡ Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢
= (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
< 0.
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But
(r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
= (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
> (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´di (g) +
¡
n¡ r ¡ yd1
¢
¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
=
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
,
and by assumption ¢w/¢´di (g) > · (1) so
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢ ¸ 0; con-
tradiction. Clearly, if y1 = r and y1d = n¡r then
¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
= 0
and Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) = Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢. But if y1 < r and/or y1d < n¡ r then¡
n¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
> 0. The result follows.
(iii) Assume that initially g is the empty network and suppose to the contrary that
sponsorship of some FTA other than the complete-regional FTA yields a higher payo¤.
Then either Ã (r, 0, (r ¡ 1)) < Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) or Ã (r, 0, (r ¡ 1)) < Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢
for all values of y1 and y1d, where r > y
1 > 1, and n¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 0. But the first inequality
implies
Ã (r, 0, (r ¡ 1))¡ Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1))
= ¡ (n¡ r)¢w/¢´di (g) + · ((n¡ r))
= ¡ (n¡ r) ¡¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)¢ < 0.
and by assumption ¢w/¢´di (g) < · (1) and so ¡ (n¡ r)
¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
> 0;
contradiction.
The second inequality implies
Ã (r, 0, (r ¡ 1))¡ Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢
= (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g)¡ yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
r ¡ 1¡ y1 ¡ yd1 + 1
¢
< 0.
But
(r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g)¡ yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡ ·
¡
r ¡ 1¡ y1 ¡ yd1 + 1
¢
= (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g)¡ yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
> (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´di (g)¡ yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
=
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
,
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and by assumption ¢w/¢´di (g) < · (1) so
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
> 0 for
r < y1+y
d
1 . Now
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢ ¡
¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1)
¢
< 0 for r > y1+yd1 . But in addition
(r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g)¡ yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
< (r ¡ y1)¢w/¢´i (g)¡ yd1¢w/¢´i (g)¡
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
· (1)
=
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
(¢w/¢´i (g)¡ · (1)) ,
and by assumption · (1) < ¢w/¢´i (g), so
¡
r ¡ y1 ¡ yd1
¢
(¢w/¢´i (g)¡ · (1)) > 0 for
r > y1 + y
d
1 . ¤
Proof of Lemma 6. Let there be a regional agreement of size r ¸ yd1 > 1 in region Rj
(i 2 Ri, i 6= j). The proof is in two parts. (i) Show that if yd1¢w/¢´di (g) > · (1) >
¢w/¢´di (g) then country i does find it worth sponsoring an extra-regional agreement
with the FTA in Rj. (ii) Show that this does not hold if · (1) > yd1¢w/¢´
d
i (g).
(i) Assume yd1¢w/¢´
d
i (g) > · (1) > ¢w/¢´
d
i (g). Suppose to the contrary that an
extra-regional agreement with the FTA in Rj is not worth sponsoring. This implies
Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 , y1
¢¡ Ã (y1, 0, y1 ¡ 1)
= yd1¢w/¢´
d
i (g)¡ · (1) < 0
But by assumption yd1¢w/¢´
d
i (g) > · (1); contradiction.
(ii) Now assume · (1) > yd1¢w/¢´
d
i (g) in order to see that country i does not
find it worth sponsoring an extra-regional agreement with the FTA in Rj. Suppose to
the contrary that such an agreement is worth sponsoring. This implies Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 , y1
¢ ¡
Ã (y1, 0, y1 ¡ 1) = yd1¢w/¢´di (g)¡ · (1) > 0; contradiction. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) Suppose to the contrary that there exists a period in which at least one FTA
is sponsored. Let t = s be the first period in which at least one FTA is sponsored.
Then by the assumption that the network is empty at t = 0, the network must be
empty at t = s ¡ 1. Taking as given the empty network g at t = s ¡ 1, the pay-
o¤ to sponsoring an agreement with y1 countries in the same region and yd1 countries
outside the region is Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
. By assumption, production-trade payo¤s
and sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma 5(i). But by Lemma 5(i),
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Ã (1, 0, 0) > Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
and therefore any country sponsoring an agreement
could gain by deleting all its links. So the network must be empty at t = s as well. As
t = s is any period t ¸ 1, the network g must be empty at every period t ¸ 1.
(ii) Suppose to the contrary that there exists a period in which there is not a world
FTA. Let t = s be a period in which the Nash network g is either empty or not connected.
By definition of equilibrium, there must exist a world FTA at t = 1. By assumption,
production-trade payo¤s and sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma
5(ii). Then by Lemma 5(ii), Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) ¸ Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡y1 + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢, for r ¸ y1 ¸
1, n ¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 0 holding with strict inequality if and only if y1 < r and/or y1d <
n ¡ r. So the empty network cannot be Nash; country i would receive a payo¤ ªi =
Ã (1, 0, 0) < Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)) and has an incentive to deviate by forming links with
all other countries. Similarly, if country i sponsors a FTA that is not a world FTA,
then it can increase its payo¤ by forming links, again contradicting Nash. By definition of
equilibrium, only one country sponsors the world FTA. If not then a second sponsor could
withdraw from sponsorship, gaining the sponsorship cost and not losing any production-
trade payo¤s, contradicting Nash.
Given that the Nash network g is connected at t = 1, then it must be connected at
t = 2. If not, then the sponsor of the agreement, country i, must have deleted some or
all of its links. But deviating in this way would yield a lower payo¤ than maintaining
all links; Ã
¡
y1, y
d
1 ,
¡
y1 + y
d
1 ¡ 1
¢¢
< Ã (r, n¡ r, (n¡ 1)), r > y1 ¸ 1, n ¡ r > y1d ¸ 0,
contradicting equilibrium. By induction, taking as given a world FTA in period t = s¡1,
it is a best response for the sponsor, country i, to maintain its sponsorship of the world
FTA at t = s. As t = s is any period t > 1, and as the network g is connected at t = 1,
it must be connected at every period t ¸ 1.
(iii) By definition, there is regionalism in the network g if there is a connected sub-
network gk for each Rk 2 C, but gij = gji = 0 for all i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j. Suppose to the
contrary that the Nash network g does not exhibit regionalism. There are two (mutually
inclusive) possibilities. One is that the Nash network g contains links gij = 1 or gji = 1
for some i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j. The other is that the subnetwork gk is not connected for
some Rk 2 C. Contradictions for these two possibilities are found in turn.
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Suppose to the contrary that at t = 1 the Nash network g contains links gij = 1 or
gji = 1 for some i 2 Ri, j 2 Rj, i 6= j. By assumption, production-trade payo¤s and
sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma 5(iii). Then by Lemma 5(iii),
Ã (r, 0, r ¡ 1) > Ã ¡r, yd1 , ¡r + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢, for r > y1 ¸ 1, n ¡ r ¸ y1d ¸ 1. Therefore, if
country i 2 Ri sponsors any links of the form gij = 1 with j 2 Rj, i 6= j, then it can gain
by deleting them, so the network g cannot be Nash. By the same argument, country i
has an incentive to break links if it sponsors a world FTA.
Now suppose that in the Nash network g of period t = 1, country i sponsors a FTA
that is not a complete-regional FTA; that is where y1 < r. But then again by Lemma
5(iii) Ã (r, 0, r ¡ 1) > Ã ¡y1, yd1 , ¡r + yd1 ¡ 1¢¢, for r > y1 ¸ 1, n¡ r > y1d ¸ 0. Therefore,
country i could gain by linking to the other countries j for which i, j 2 Ri, so the network
g cannot be Nash. It follows that for each Rk 2 C the subnetwork gk must be connected.
By definition of equilibrium, only one country sponsors the complete-regional FTA. If not
then a second sponsor could withdraw from sponsorship, gaining the sponsorship cost and
not losing any production-trade payo¤s, contradicting Nash.
(iv) Conditions (b) and (c) are exactly as in (iii) so from (iii) we know that there
must be regionalism at t = 1. Take the network from period 1 as given, where the
subnetworks gk are connected for the elements of all Rk 2 C. Suppose to the contrary
that at t = 2 the Nash network g is not connected. By assumption, production-trade
payo¤s and sponsorship costs are in the same relation as in Lemma 5(iii). If at t = 2
any subnetwork gk is not connected then by Lemma 5(iii) there is an incentive to deviate
by forming links to other countries within Rk so g cannot be Nash. Moreover, condition
(a) implies that production-trade payo¤s and sponsorship costs are in the same relation
as in Lemma 6. So by Lemma 6, if there does not exist a link between country i 2 Ri
and j 2 Rj, i 6= j, then country i could gain by forming a link with a country in another
region, Ã
¡
r, ayd1 , r + a¡ 1
¢
> Ã (r, 0, r ¡ 1), 0 < ayd1 · (n¡ r), a ¸ 1, contradicting
Nash.
Finally, suppose that condition (a) does not hold, so that the payo¤ from linking to a
FTA in another region is not greater than the sponsorship cost. Then the Nash network
g cannot be complete, because if country i 2 Ri sponsors any links to countries j 2 Rj,
then it could gain by breaking those links. However, given that conditions (b) and (c)
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continue to hold, and given regionalism at t = 1, there is no incentive for any country to
deviate at t = 2. By (iii), any sponsor of a regional agreement could not gain by deleting
links. So there is regionalism in at t = 1. Under these same conditions, given regionalism
at t = s¡ 1, there must be regionalism at t = s. So when (a) fails to hold there must be
regionalism at all points on the equilibrium path. ¤
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